We propose axiomatizations of monadic second-order logic (MSO), monadic transitive closure logic (FO(TC 1 )) and monadic least fixpoint logic (FO(LFP 1 )) on finite node-labeled sibling-ordered trees. We show by a uniform argument, that our axiomatizations are complete, i.e., in each of our logics, every formula which is valid on the class of finite trees is provable using our axioms. We are interested in this class of structures because it allows to represent basic structures of computer science such as XML documents, linguistic parse trees and treebanks. The logics we consider are rich enough to express interesting properties such as reachability. On arbitrary structures, they are well known to be not recursively axiomatizable.
We develop a uniform method for obtaining complete axiomatizations of fragments of MSO on trees. In particular, we obtain a complete axiomatization for MSO, FO(TC 1 ), and FO(LFP 1 ) on finite node labeled sibling-ordered trees. We take inspiration from Kees Doets, who proposed in [4] a complete axiomatization of first-order logic (FO) on the class of node-labeled finite trees without sibling-order. A similar result was shown in [1] and [19] for FO on node-labeled finite trees with sibling order. We use the signature of [19] and extend the set of axioms proposed there.
Finite trees are basic and ubiquitous structures which are of interest at least to mathematicians, computer scientists (tree-structured documents) and linguists (parse trees). The logics we study are known to be very well-behaved on this particular class of structures and to have an interestingly high expressive power. In particular, they all allow to express reachability, but at the same time, they have the advantage of being decidable on trees.
As XML documents are tree-structured data, our results are particularly relevant to XML query languages. Query languages are logical languages used to make queries into database and information systems. In [20] and [8] , MSO and FO(TC 1 ) have been proposed as a yardstick of expressivity on trees for these languages. It is known that FO(LFP 1 ) has the same expressive power as MSO on trees, but the translations between the two are non-trivial, and hence it is not clear whether an axiomatization for one language can be obtained from an axiomatization for the other language in any straightforward way. * We are grateful to Jouko Väänänen for helpful comments on an earlier draft. The authors are supported by a GLoRiClass fellowship of the European Commission (Research Training Fellowship MEST-CT-2005-020841) and by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) grant 639.021.508, respectively.
In applications to computational linguistics, finite trees are used to represent the grammatical structure of natural language sentences. In the context of model theoretic syntax, Rogers advocates in [18] the use of MSO in order to characterize derivation trees of context free grammars. Kepser also argues in [12] that MSO should be used in order to query treebanks. A treebank is a text corpus in which each sentence has been annotated with its syntactic structure (represented as a tree structure). In [13] and [21] Kepser and Tiede propose to consider various transitive closure logics, among which FO(TC 1 ), arguing that they constitute very natural formalisms from the logical point of view, allowing concise and intuitive phrasing of parse tree properties.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 1 we present the concept of finite tree and the logics we are interested in together with their standard interpretation. Section 2 merely states our three axiomatizations. In Section 3, we introduce non standard semantics called Henkin semantics, for which our axiomatizations are easily seen to be complete. Section 4 introduces operations on Henkin structures: substructure formation and a general operation of Henkin structures combination. We obtain Feferman-Vaught theorems for this operation by means of Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé games. In Section 5, we prove real completeness (that is, on the restricted class of finite trees). For that purpose, we consider substructures of trees that we call forests and use the general operation discussed in Section 4 to combine a set of forests into one new forest. Our Feferman-Vaught theorems apply to such constructions and we use them in our main proof of completeness, showing that no formula of our language can distinguish Henkin models of our axioms from real finite trees. We also point out that every standard model of our axioms actually is a finite tree.
We provide additional proofs in Appendix. Appendix A contains proofs of Henkin completeness theorems for our logics. Appendix B contains the proof a relativization lemma that we use in Section 4 and Section 5.2 in order to show that whenever a property is definable in a substructure of some given structure, then it is also definable in this structure. Appendix C contains the definitions and adequacy proofs of three EhrenfeuchtFraïssé games that we use in Appendix D to prove our Feferman-Vaught theorems.
Preliminaries

Finite Trees
A tree is a partially ordered set such that the set of predecessors of any element (or node) is well-ordered (a set is well-ordered if all its non-empty subsets have a least element) and there is a unique smallest element called the root. We are interested in finite node-labeled sibling-ordered trees: finite trees in which the children of each node are linearly ordered. Also, the nodes can be labeled by unary predicates. We will call these structures finite trees for short.
Definition 1 (Finite tree). Assume a fixed finite set of unary predicate symbols {P 1 , . . . , P n }. By a finite tree, we mean a finite structure M = (M, <, ≺, P 1 , . . . , P n ), where (M, <) is a tree (with < the descendant relation) and ≺ linearly orders the children of each node.
Three Extensions of First-Order Logic
In this section, we introduce three extensions of FO: MSO, FO(TC 1 ) and FO(LFP 1 ). In the remaining of the paper (unless explicitly stated otherwise), we will always be working with a fixed purely relational vocabulary σ (i.e. with no individual constant or function symbols) and hence, with σ-structures. We assume as usual that we have a countably infinite set of first-order variables. In the case of MSO and FO(LFP 1 ), we also assume that we have a countably infinite set of set variables. The semantics defined in this section we will refer to as standard semantics and the associated structures, as standard structures.
We first introduce monadic second order logic, MSO, which is the extension of firstorder logic in which we can quantify over the subsets of the domain.
Definition 2 (Syntax and semantics of MSO). Let At be a first-order atomic formula, x a first-order variable and X a set variable, we define the set of MSO formulas in the following way:
We use ∀Xφ (resp. ∀xφ) as shorthand for ¬∃X¬φ (resp. ¬∃x¬φ). We define the quantifier depth of a MSO formula as the maximal number of first-order and second-order nested quantifiers. We interpret MSO formulas in first-order structures. Like for FO formulas, the truth of MSO formulas in M is defined modulo a valuation g of variables as objects. But here, we also have set variables, to which g assigns subsets of the domain. We let g[a/x] be the assignment which differs from g only in assigning a to x (similarly for g [A/X] ). The truth of atomic formulas is defined by the usual FO clauses plus the following:
M, g |= Xx iff g(x) ∈ g(X) for X a set variable
The truth of compound formulas is defined by induction, with the same clauses as in FO and an additional one:
The second logic we are interested in is monadic transitive closure logic, FO(TC 1 ), which extends FO by closing it under the transitive closure of binary definable relations.
Definition 3 (Syntax and semantics of FO(TC 1 )). Let u, v, x, y be first-order variables, φ(x, y) a FO(TC 1 ) formula (which, besides x and y, possibly contains other free variables), we define the set of FO(TC 1 ) formulas in the following way:
We use ∀xφ as shorthand for ¬∃x¬φ. We define the quantifier depth of a FO(TC 1 ) formula as the maximal number of nested first-order quantifiers and T C operators. We interpret FO(TC 1 ) formulas in first-order structures. The notion of assignation and the truth of atomic formulas is defined as in FO. The truth of compound formulas is defined by induction, with the same clauses as in FO and an additional one:
M, g |= [T C xy φ] (u, v) iff for all A ⊆ M , if g(u) ∈ A and for all a, b ∈ M , a ∈ A and M, g[a/x, b/y] |= φ(x, y) implies b ∈ A, then g(v) ∈ A.
Proposition 1. On standard structures, the following semantical clause for the T C operator is equivalent to the one given above:
M, g |= [T C xy φ(x, y)](u, v) iff there exist a 1 . . . a n ∈ M with g(u) = a 1 and g(v) = a n and M, g |= φ(a i , a i+1 ) for all 0 < i < n Proof. Indeed, suppose there is a finite sequence of points a 1 . . . a n such that g(u) = a 1 , g(v) = a n , and for each i < n, M, g[x/a i ; y/a i+1 ] |= φ. Then for any subset A containing a 1 and which is closed under φ, we can show by induction on the length of the sequence a 1 . . . a n that a n belongs to A. Now, on the other hand, suppose that there is no finite sequence like described above. To show that there is a subset A of the required form, we simply take A to be the set of all points that "can be reached from u by a finite sequence". By assumption, v does not belong to this set and the set is closed under φ.
Intuitively this means that for a formula of the form [T C xy φ](u, v) to hold on a standard structure, there must be a finite "φ path" between the points that are named by the variables u and v.
Finally we will also be interested in monadic least fixpoint logic (FO(LFP 1 )), which extends FO with set variables and an explicit monadic least fixpoint operator. Consider a FO(LFP 1 ) formula φ(X, x) and a structure M together with a valuation g. This formula induces an operator F φ taking a set A ⊆ dom(M) to the set {a :
is concerned with least fixpoints of such operators. If φ is positive in X (a formula is positive in X whenever X only occurs in the scope of an even number of negations), the operator F φ is monotone (i.e. X ⊆ Y implies F φ (X) ⊆ F φ (Y )). Monotone operators always have a least fixpoint LF P (F ) = {X|F (X) ⊂ X} (defined as the intersection of all their prefixpoints).
Definition 4 (Syntax and semantics of FO(LFP 1 )). Let X be a set variable, x, y FO variables, ψ, ξ FO(LFP 1 ) formulas and φ(x, X) a FO(LFP 1 ) formula positive in X (besides x and X, φ(x, X) possibly contains other free variables), we define the set of FO(LFP 1 ) formulas in the following way:
We use ∀xψ as shorthand for ¬∃x¬ψ. We define the quantifier depth of a FO(LFP 1 ) formula as the maximal number of nested first-order quantifiers and LF P operators. Again, we can interpret FO(LFP 1 ) formulas in first-order structures. The notion of assignation and the truth of atomic formulas are defined similarly as in the MSO case. The truth of compound formulas is defined by induction, with the same clauses as in FO and an additional one:
Remark 1. In practice we will use an equivalent (less intuitive but often more convenient) rephrasing:
Expressive Power
There is a recursive procedure, transforming any FO(
(The other ones are all of the same type, e.g. (φ ∧ ψ) * = (φ * ∧ ψ * ).) This procedure can easily be seen adequate by considering the semantical clause for the LF P operator.
Now there is also a recursive procedure transforming any FO( ∧φ(x, y) ))]v. Let us give an argument for this claim. By Proposition 1 it is enough to show that [LF P Xy y = u∨∃x(Xx∧φ(x, y) )]v holds if and only if there is a finite φ path from u to v. For the right to left direction, suppose there is such a path a 1 . . . a n with g(u) = a 1 and g(v) = a n . Then, for any subset A of the domain, we can show by induction on i that if for all a i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), a i = u ∨ ∃x((Ax ∧ φ(x, a i ) ) implies a i ∈ A, then v ∈ A, i.e., [LF P Xy y = u ∨ ∃x((Xx ∧ φ(x, y) ))]v holds. Now for the left to right direction, suppose there is no such φ path. Consider the set A of all points that can be reached from u by a finite φ path. By assumption, ¬Av and it holds that ∀y(
It is known that on arbitrary structures FO(TC 1 ) < FO(LFP 1 ) < MSO (see [5] ) and on trees FO(TC 1 ) < trees FO(LFP 1 ) = trees MSO (see [20] and [17] ). It is also known that the (not FO definable) class of finite trees is already definable in FO(TC 1 ) (see for instance [13] ), which is the weakest of the logics studied here. We provide additional detail in Section 5.3.
The Axiomatizations
As many arguments in this paper equally hold for MSO, FO(TC 1 ) and FO(LFP 1 ), we let Λ ∈ {MSO, FO(TC 1 ), FO(LFP 1 )} and use Λ as a symbol for any one of them. The axiomatization of Λ on finite trees consists of three parts: the axioms of first-order logic, the specific axioms of Λ, and the specific axioms on finite trees.
To axiomatize FO, we adopt the infinite set of logical axioms and the two rules of inference given in Figure 1 (like in [6] , except from the fact that we use a generalization rule). To axiomatize MSO, the axioms and rule of Figure 2 are added to the axiomatization of FO. We call the resulting system MSO . COM P. stands for "comprehension" by analogy with the comprehension axiom of set theory. M SO1 plays a similar role as F O2, M SO2 as F O3 and M SO3 as F O4. To axiomatize FO(TC 1 ), the axiom and rule of Figure 3 are added to the axiomatization of FO. We call the resulting system FO(TC 1 ) . To axiomatize FO(LFP 1 ), the axiom and rule of Figure 4 are added to the axiomatization of FO. We call the resulting system FO(LFP 1 ) . We are interested in axiomatizing Λ on the class of finite trees. For that purpose we restrict the class of considered structures by adding to Λ the axioms given in Figure 5 . We call the resulting system tree Λ . Note that the induction scheme in Figure 5 allows to reason by induction on properties definable in Λ only. Also, for technical convenience, we adopt the following convention:
Definition 5. Let Γ be a set of Λ-formulas and φ a Λ-formula. By Γ Λ φ we will always mean that there are ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n ∈ Γ such that
Now the main result of this paper is that on standard structures, the Λ theory of finite trees is completely axiomatized by tree Λ . In the remaining sections we will progressively build a proof of it.
FO1.
Tautologies of sentential calculus FO2.
∀xφ → φ x t , where t is substitutable for
φ → ∀xφ, where x does not occur free in φ FO5.
x = x FO6.
x = y → (φ → ψ), where φ is atomic and ψ is obtained from φ by replacing x in zero or more (but not necessarily all) places by y. Modus Ponens if φ and φ → ψ, then ψ FO Generalization if φ, then ∀xφ ∃X∀x(Xx ↔ φ), where X does not occur free in φ MSO1.
∀Xφ → φ[X/T ], where T (which is either a set variable or a monadic predicate) is substitutable in φ for X. MSO2.
φ → ∀Xφ, where X does not occur free in φ MSO Generalization if φ, then ∀Xφ 
FO(TC
where ψ is any FO(LFP 1 ) formula and φ(x, ψ) is the result of the replacement in φ(x, X) of each occurrence of X by ψ (renaming variables when needed) FO(LFP 1 ) Generalization if ξ → (∀x(φ(x, P ) → P (x)) → P (y)), and P positive in φ does not occur in ξ, T1.
∀xy(x ≺ y → ∃z(x ≺ imm z ∧ z y)) immediately next sibling T9.
∀x∃y(y x ∧ ¬∃z(z ≺ y)) there is a least sibling T10.
where φ(x) ranges over Λ-formulas in one free variable x and x < imm y is shorthand for x < y ∧ ¬∃z(z < y ∧ x < z), x ≺ imm y is shorthand for x ≺ y ∧ ¬∃z(x ≺ z ∧ z ≺ y)
Figure 5: Specific axioms on finite trees
Henkin Completeness
As it is well known, MSO, FO(TC 1 ) and FO(LFP 1 ) are highly undecidable on arbitrary standard structures (by arbitrary, we mean any sort of structure: infinite trees, arbitrary graphs, partial orders. . . ) and hence not recursively enumerable. So in order to show that our axiomatizations tree Λ are complete on finite trees, we resort to a special trick, already used by Kees Doets in his PhD thesis [4] . We proceed in two steps. First, we show three Henkin completeness theorems, based on non standard (so called Henkin) semantics for MSO, FO(TC 1 ) and FO(LFP 1 ) (on the general topic of Henkin semantics, see [10] , the original paper by Henkin and also [16] ). Each semantics respectively extends the class of standard structures with non standard (Henkin) MSO, FO(TC 1 ) and FO(LFP 1 )-structures. By the Henkin completeness theorems, our axiomatic systems tree Λ naturally turn out to be complete on the wider class of their Henkin-models. But by compactness, some of these models are infinite. As a second step, we show in Section 5 that no Λ-sentence can distinguish between standard and non-standard Λ-Henkin-models among models of our axioms. This entails that our axioms are complete on the class of (standard) finite trees, i.e., each Λ-sentence valid on this class is provable using tree Λ . Now let us point out that Kees Doets was interested in the completeness of first-order logic on finite trees. Thus, he was relying on the FO completeness theorem and if he was working with non-standard models of the FO theory of finite trees, he was not concerned with non standard Henkinstructures in our sense. Hence, what makes the originality of the method developed in this paper is its use of Henkin semantics. So let us begin with the concept of Henkin-structure. Such structures are particular cases among structures called frames and it is convenient to define frames before defining Henkin-structures. Definition 6 (Frames). Let σ be a purely relational vocabulary. A σ-frame M consists of a non-empty universe dom(M), an interpretation in dom(M) of the predicates in σ and a set of admissible subsets A M ⊆ ℘(dom(M)).
Whenever A M = ℘(dom(M)), M can be identified to a standard structure. Assignments g into M are defined as in standard semantics, except that if X is a set variable, then we require that g(X) ∈ A M .
Definition 7 (Interpretation of Λ-formulas in frames). Λ-formulas are interpreted in frames as in standard structures, except for the three following clauses. The set quantifier clause of MSO becomes:
The T C clause of FO(TC 1 ) becomes:
And finally the LF P clause of FO(LFP 1 ) becomes:
Definition 8 (Λ-Henkin-Structures). A Λ-Henkin-structure is a frame M that is closed under Λ-definability, i.e., for each Λ-formula ϕ and assignment g into M:
Remark 2. Note that any finite Λ-Henkin-structure is a standard structure, as every subset of the domain is parametrically definable in a finite structure. Hence, non standard Henkin structures are always infinite. Theorem 1. Λ is completely axiomatized on Λ-Henkin-structures by Λ , i.e., for every set of Λ-formulas Γ and Λ-formula φ, φ is true in all Λ-Henkin-structures of Γ if and only if Γ Λ φ.
Proof. The proofs are given in Appendix A (Theorems 5, 6, 7).
Compactness follows directly from Definition 5 and Theorem 1, i.e., a possibly infinite set of Λ-sentences has a model if and only if every finite subset of it has a model. It also follows directly from Theorem 1 that tree Λ is complete on the class of its Λ-Henkin-models. Nevertheless, by compactness the axioms of tree Λ are also satisfied on infinite trees. We overcome this problem by defining a slightly larger class of Henkin structures, which we will call definably well-founded Λ-quasi-trees.
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Definition 9. A Λ-quasi-tree is any Λ-Henkin structure (T, <, ≺, P 1 , . . . , P n , A T ) (where A T is the set of admissible subsets of T ) satisfying the axioms and rules of Λ and the axioms T1-T11 of Figure 5 . A Λ-quasi-tree is definably well founded if, in addition, it satisfies all instances of the induction scheme Ind of Figure 5 . 
Operations on Henkin-Structures
Let Λ ∈ {MSO, FO(TC 1 ), FO(LFP 1 )}. As noted in Remark 2, every finite Λ-Henkin structure is also a standard structure. Hence, when working in finite model theory, it is enough to rely on the usual FO constructions to define operations on structures. On the other hand, even though our main completeness result concerns finite trees, inside the proof we need to consider infinite (Λ-Henkin) structures and operations on them. In this context, methods for forming new structures out of existing ones have to be redefined carefully. We first propose a notion of substructure of a Λ-Henkin-structure generated by one of its parametrically definable admissible subsets:
Definition 10 (Λ-substructure). Let M = (dom(M), P red, A M ) be a Λ-Henkin-structure (where P red is the interpretation of the predicates). We call M F O = (dom(M), P red) the FO-structure underlying M. Given a parametrically definable set A ∈ A M , the Λ-substructure of M generated by A is the structure
as the vocabulary is purely relational) and
Proposition 2. Take M and A as previously and consider the structure Now, in order to show that Λ-substructures are Henkin-structures, we introduce a notion of relativization and a corresponding relativization lemma. This lemma establishes that for any Λ-Henkin-structure M and Λ-substructure M A of M (with A a set parametrically definable in M), if a set is parametrically definable in M A then it is also parametrically definable in M. This result will be useful again in Section 5.2.
Definition 11 (Relativization mapping). Given two Λ-formulas φ, ψ having no variables in common and given a FO variable x, we define REL(φ, ψ, x) by induction on the complexity of φ and call it the relativization of φ to ψ:
• If φ :≈ ∃yχ, REL(φ, ψ, x) = ∃y(ψ[y/x]∧REL(χ, ψ, x)) (where ψ[y/x] is the formula obtained by replacing in ψ every occurrence of x by y),
Lemma 1 (Relativization lemma). Let M be a Λ-Henkin-structure, g a valuation on M, φ, ψ Λ-formulas and A = {x | M, g |= ψ}. If g(y) ∈ A for every variable y occurring free in φ and g(Y ) ∈ M A for every set variable Y occurring free in φ,
Proof. Given in Appendix B (Lemma 13).
Lemma 2. M A is a Λ-Henkin-structure.
Proof. Take B parametrically definable in M A, i.e., there is a Λ-formula φ(y) and an assignment g such that B = {a ∈ dom(M A) | M A, g[a/y] |= φ(y)}. Now we know that A is also parametrically definable in M, i.e., there is a Λ-formula ψ(x) and an assignment g such that
. that φ and ψ have no variables in common, we define an assignment g * by letting g * (z) = g (z) for every variable z occurring in ψ and g * (z) = g(z) otherwise. The situation with set variables is symmetric. Now by Lemma 1 
There is in model theory a whole range of methods to form new structures out of existing ones. A standard reference on the matter is [7] , written in a very general algebraic setting. Familiar constructions like disjoint unions of FO-structures are redefined as particular cases of a new notion of generalized product of FO-structures and abstract properties of such products are studied. In particular, an important theorem now called the Feferman-Vaught theorem for FO is proven. We are particularly interested in one of its corollaries, which establishes that generalized products of FO-structures preserve elementary equivalence. This is related to our work in that we show an analogue of this result for a particular case of generalized product of Λ-Henkin-structures that we call fusion, this notion being itself a generalization of a notion of disjoint unions of Λ-Henkin-structures that we also define.
Definition 12 (Disjoint union of Λ-Henkin-structures). Let σ be a purely relational vocabulary and σ * = σ∪{Q 1 , . . . , Q k }, with {Q 1 , . . . , Q k } a set of new monadic predicates. For any Λ-Henkin-structures M 1 , . . . , M k in vocabulary σ with disjoint domains, define their disjoint union 1≤i≤k M i (or, direct sum) to be the σ * -frame that has as its domain the union of the domains of the structures M i and likewise for the relations, except for the predicates Q i , whose interpretations are respectively defined as the domain of the structures M i (we will use Q i to index the elements of M i ). The set of admissible subsets A U 1≤i≤k M i is the closure under finite union of the union of the sets of admissible subsets of the M i . That is:
It is shown in Appendix D that disjoint unions of Λ-Henkin-structures are also Λ-Henkin-structures (Corollaries 7, 11, 15) .
Definition 13 (f -fusion of Λ-Henkin-structures). Let σ be a purely relational vocabulary and σ * = σ ∪ {Q 1 , . . . , Q k }, with {Q 1 , . . . , Q k } a set of new monadic predicates. Let f be a function mapping each n-ary predicate P ∈ σ to a quantifier-free formula over σ in variables x 1 , . . . , x n . For any Λ-Henkin-structures M 1 , . . . , M k in vocabulary σ with disjoint domains, define their f -fusion to be the σ-frame f 1≤i≤k M i that has the same domain and set of admissible subsets as 1≤i≤k M i . For any P ∈ σ, the interpretation of P in f 1≤i≤k M i is the set of n-tuples satisfying f (P (x 1 . . . x n )) in 1≤i≤k M i . An easy example of f -fusion on standard structures 2 is the ordered sum of two linear orders (M 1 , < 1 ), (M 2 , < 2 ), where all the elements of M 1 are before the elements of M 2 . In this case, σ consists of a single binary relation <, the elements of M 1 are indexed with Q 1 , those of M 2 with Q 2 and f maps < to x < y ∨ (Q 1 x ∧ Q 2 y).
We show preservation results involving f -fusions of Λ-Henkin-structures. Hence we deal with analogues of elementary equivalence for these logics and we refer to Λ-equivalence.
Definition 14. Given two Λ-Henkin-structures M and N, we write M ≡ Λ N and say that M and N are Λ-equivalent if they satisfy the same Λ-sentences. Also, for any natural number n, we write M ≡ n Λ N and say that M and N are n-Λ-equivalent if M and N satisfy the same Λ-sentences of quantifier depth at most n. In particular, M ≡ Λ N holds iff, for all n, M ≡ n Λ N holds. Now we are ready to introduce our "Feferman-Vaught theorems". Comparable work had already been done by Makowski in [15] for extensions of FO, but a crucial difference is that he only considered standard structures, whereas we need to deal with Λ-Henkinstructures. Our proofs make use of Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé games (defined in Appendix C: Definitions 24, 25, 26) for each of the logics Λ. The MSO game, that we show to be adequate, is rather straightforward and has already been used by other authors (see for instance [14] ). The FO(LFP 1 ) game is borrowed from Uwe Bosse [2] . It also applies to Henkin structures, as careful inspection of its adequacy proof shows. The FO(TC 1 ) game has already been mentioned in passing by Grädel in [9] as an alternative to the game he used and we show that it is adequate. It looks also similar to a system of partial isomorphisms given in [3] . However it is important to note that this game is different from the FO(TC 1 ) game which is actually used in [9] . The two games are equivalent when played on standard structures, but not when played on FO(TC 1 )-Henkin structures. This is so because the game used in [3] relies on the alternative semantics for the T C operator given in Proposition 1, so that only finite sets of points can be chosen by players ; whereas the game we use involves choices of not necessarily finite admissible subsets. These are not equivalent approaches. Indeed, on FO(TC 1 )-Henkin structures a simple compactness argument shows that the semantical clause of Proposition 1 (defined in terms of existence of a finite path) is not adequate.
Using these games we show that f -fusions of Λ-Henkin-structures preserve Λ-equivalence.
For any f such as described in definition 13, whenever
Proof. The proofs are given in the second Appendix (Theorem 12 and Corollaries 8 and 12).
As shown in Appendix D (Theorem 5 and Corollaries 9, 13) analogues of these theorems for disjoint union follow as well.
Proof. The proofs are given in Appendix D (Corollaries 6, 10 and 14).
Completeness on Finite Trees
Forests and Operations on Forests
In Section 5.2, we will prove that no Λ-sentence can distinguish Λ-Henkin-models of tree Λ from standard models of tree Λ . More precisely, we will show that for each n, any definably well-founded Λ-quasi-tree is n-Λ-equivalent to a finite tree. In order to give an inductive proof, it will be more convenient to consider a stronger version of this result concerning a class of finite and infinite Henkin structures that we call quasi-forests. In this section, we give the definition of quasi-forest and we show how they can be combined into bigger quasi-forests using the notion of fusion from Section 4. Whenever quasi forests are finite, we simply call them finite forests. As a simple example, consider a finite tree and remove the root node, then it is no longer a finite tree. Instead it is a finite sequence of trees, whose roots stand in a linear (sibling) order.
3 It does not have a unique root, but it does have a unique left-most root. For technical reasons it will be convenient in the definition of quasi forests to add an extra monadic predicate R labelling the roots.
Given a node a in T , consider the Λ-substructure of T generated by the set {x | ∃z(a z ∧ z ≤ x)}, which is the set formed by a together with all its siblings to the right and their descendants. The Λ-quasi-forest T a is obtained by labeling each root in this substructure with R (Rx ⇔ def ¬∃y y < x). Whenever T is a tree, we simply call T a a forest.
We will show in our main proof of completeness that for each n and for each node a in a Λ-Henkin definably well-founded quasi-tree, the Λ-quasi-forest T a is n-Λ-equivalent to a finite forest. Our proof will use a notion of composition of Λ-quasi-forests which is a special case of fusion. Given a single node forest F 1 and two Λ-quasi-forests F 2 and F 3 , we construct a new Λ-quasi-forest COM P (F 1 , F 2 , F 3 ) by letting the only element in F 1 be the left-most root, the roots of F 2 become the children of this node and the roots of F 3 become its siblings to the right. We then derive a corollary of Theorem 2 for compositions of Λ-quasi-forests and use it in Section 5.2.
Definition 16. Let σ = {<, ≺, R, P 1 , . . . , P n }, be a relational vocabulary with only monadic predicates except < and ≺. Given three additional monadic predicates Q 1 , Q 2 , Q 3 , we define a mapping COM P from σ to quantifier-free formulas over σ ∪ {Q 1 , Q 2 , Q 3 } by letting
Corollary 2. Let F 1 be a single node forest and
Main Proof of Completeness
Lemma 3. For all n ∈ N, every definably well-founded Λ-quasi-tree of finite signature is n-Λ-equivalent to a finite tree. In particular, a Λ-sentence is valid on definably wellfounded Λ-quasi-trees iff it is valid on finite trees.
Proof. Let T be a Λ-quasi-tree, w.l.o.g. assume that a monadic predicate R labels its root. During this proof, it will be convenient to work with Λ-quasi-forests. Note that finite Λ-quasi-forests are simply finite forests and finite Λ-quasi-trees are simply finite trees. Let X n be the set of all nodes a of T for which it holds that T a is n-Λ-equivalent to a finite forest. We first show that "belonging to X n " is a property definable in T (Claim 1). Then, we use the induction scheme to show that every node of a definably well-founded Λ-quasi-tree (and in particular, the root) has this property (Claim 2).
, and hence is defined by a Λ-formula of quantifier depth n + 1.
. We will show that T a ≡ Λ n T b , and hence, by the definition of X n , a ∈ X n iff b ∈ X n . By the definition of Λ-quasi-forests, dom(T a ) = {x | ∃z(a z∧z ≤ x)}. Let φ be any Λ-sentence of quantifier depth n. We can assume w.l.o.g. that φ does not contain the variables z and x (otherwise we can rename in φ these two variables).
For the second part of the claim, note that, up to logical equivalence, there are only finitely many Λ-formulas of any given quantifier depth, as the vocabulary is finite.
Claim 2: If all descendants and siblings to the right of a belong to X n , then a itself belongs to X n .
Proof of claim. Let us consider the case where a has both a descendant and a following sibling (all other cases are simpler). Then, by axioms T3, T5, T8, T9 and T10, a has a first child b, and an immediate next sibling c. Moreover, we know that both b and c are in X n . In other words, T b and T c are n-Λ-equivalent to finite forests T b and T c . Now, we construct a finite Λ-quasi-forest T a by taking a COM P -fusion of T b , T c and of the Λ-substructure of T generated by {a}, which unique element becomes a common parent of all roots of T b and a left sibling of all roots of T c . So we get T a = COM P (T {a}, T b , T c )). It is not hard to see that T a is again a finite forest. Moreover, by the fusion lemma,
The domain of each of these three structures is definable in T a , let say φ 1 defines dom(T {a}), φ 2 defines dom(T b ) and φ 3 defines dom(T c ). So each A i component is definable in T a (just take the conjunction φ i (x)∧Ax). But then A i was already definable in COM P (T {a}, T b , T c ) (by construction of this structure).
It follows from these two claims, by the induction scheme for definable properties, that X n contains all nodes of the Λ-quasi-tree, including the root, and hence T is n-Λ-equivalent to a finite tree. For the second statement of the lemma, it suffices to note that every Λ-sentence has a finite vocabulary and a finite quantifier depth.
The Λ-theory of finite trees is completely axiomatized by tree Λ .
Proof. Theorem 3 follows directly from Lemma 3 and Corollary 1.
The set of
tree Λ consequences defines the class of finite trees Proposition 4 shows together with Theorem 3 that on standard structures, the set of tree Λ consequences actually defines the class of finite trees. That is, tree Λ has no infinite standard model at all.
On standard structures, there is a Λ-formula which defines the class of finite trees.
Sketch of the proof. It is enough to show it for Λ = FO(TC 1 ). It follows by Section 1.3 that it also holds for MSO and FO(LFP 1 ). We merely give a sketch of the proof. For additional details we refer the reader to [13] . It can be shown that on standard structures, the finite conjunction of the axioms T1-T11 in Figure 5 "almost" defines the class of finite trees, i.e. any finite structure satisfying this conjunction is a finite tree. Now we will explain how to construct an other sentence, which together with this one, actually defines on arbitrary standard structures the class of finite trees. Let L be a shorthand for the formula labelling the leaves in the tree (Lx ⇔ def ¬∃yx < y) and R a shorthand for the formula labelling the root (Rx ⇔ def ¬∃yy < x). Consider the depth-first left-to-right ordering of nodes in a tree and the FO(TC 1 ) formula φ(x, y) saying "the node that comes after x in this ordering is y":
There is also a FO(TC 1 ) formula which says that "x is the very last node in this ordering". φ(x, y) can be combined with this formula into an FO(TC 1 ) formula χ expressing that the tree is finite by saying that (we rely here for the interpretation of χ on the alternative semantics for the T C operator given in Proposition 1) "there is a finite sequence of nodes x 1 . . . x n such that x 1 is the root, x i+1 the node that comes after x i in the above ordering, for all i, and x n is the very last node of the tree in the above ordering".
Theorem 4. The set of tree Λ consequences defines the class of finite trees.
Proof. By Proposition 4 we can express in Λ by means of some formula χ that a structure is a finite tree. So χ is necessarily a consequence of tree Λ (as it is a Λ-formula valid on the class of finite trees).
Conclusions
In this paper, taking inspiration from Kees Doets [4] we developed a uniform method for obtaining complete axiomatizations of fragments of MSO on finite trees. For that purpose, we had to adapt classical tools and notions from finite model theory to the specificities of Henkin semantics. The presence of admissible subsets called for some refinements in model theoretic constructions such as formation of substructure or disjoint union. Also, we noticed that not every Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé game that has been used for FO(TC 1 ) was suitable to use on Henkin-structures. We focused on a game which doesn't seem to have been used previously in the literature. We also elaborated analogues of the FO FefermanVaught theorem for MSO, FO(TC 1 ) and FO(LFP 1 ). We considered fusions of structures, a particular case of the Feferman-Vaught notion of generalized product and obtained results which might be interesting to generalize and use in other contexts.
We applied our method to MSO, FO(TC 1 ) and FO(LFP 1 ), but it would be worth also examining other fragments of MSO, such as monadic deterministic transitive closure logic (FO(DTC 1 )) or monadic alternating transitive closure logic (FO(ATC 1 )), see also [3] . Finally, an important feature of our main completeness argument is the way we used the inductive scheme of Figure 5 . Hence, extending our approach to another class of finite structures would involve finding a comparable scheme. We also know that we should focus on a logic which is decidable on this class, as on finite structures recursive enumerability is equivalent to decidability. This suggests that other natural candidates would be fragments of MSO on classes of finite structures with bounded treewidth. 
A Henkin Completeness Proofs
Let Λ ∈ {MSO, FO(TC 1 ), FO(LFP 1 )}. In this appendix we show that Λ is complete on the class of Λ-Henkin-structures. We are not yet concerned with tree Λ and we do not consider the specific axioms on trees listed in Figure 5 .
Up to now we have been working with purely relational vocabularies. Here we will be using individual constants in the standard way, but only for the sake of readability (we could dispense with them and use FO variables instead). Also, whenever this is clear from the context, we will use as shorthand for Λ .
A.1 The MSO-Henkin Completeness Proof
This proof is an adaptation to the case of MSO of the proof of completeness for FO given in [6] and of the proof of completeness for the theory of types given in [16] .
Lemma 4 (FO generalization lemma). If Γ φ and x does not occur free in Γ, then Γ ∀xφ.
Proof. (by Enderton) Consider a fixed set Γ and a variable x not free in Γ. We show by induction that for any theorem φ of Γ, we have Γ ∀xφ. For this it suffices (by the induction principle) to show that the set {φ : Γ ∀xφ} includes Γ ∪ Ax M SO (where Ax M SO is the set of logical axioms given in Figures 1 and 2 ) and is closed under modus ponens. Notice that x can occur free in φ. Case 1. φ is a logical axiom. Then ∀xφ is also a logical axiom. And so Γ ∀xφ.
Case 2. φ ∈ Γ. Then x does not occur free in φ. Hence φ → ∀xφ is an instance of F O4. Consequently, Γ ∀xφ, as from φ (which is in Γ) and φ → ∀xφ (which is an instance of F O4) we can infer by modus ponens that ∀xφ.
Case 3. φ is obtained by modus ponens from ψ and ψ → φ. Then by inductive hypothesis we have Γ ∀xψ and Γ ∀x(ψ → φ). This is just the situation in which axiom group F O3 is useful. We have Γ ∀xφ. The proof goes as follows. From ψ → φ we obtain by generalization ∀xψ → φ, which together with ∀x(ψ → φ) → (∀xψ → ∀xφ) (which is an instance of F O3) gives by modus ponens ∀xψ → ∀xφ. Now by generalization from ψ we obtain ∀xψ and by modus ponens, ∀xφ.
So by induction Γ ∀xφ for every theorem φ of Γ.
Lemma 5 (MSO generalization theorem). If Γ φ and X does not occur free in Γ, then Γ ∀Xφ.
Proof. The proof is similar as in the FO case, except that MSO generalization is used instead of FO generalization and M SO2 and M SO3 are used instead of, respectively, F O3 and F O4.
Definition 17. We say that a set of MSO formulas ∆ contains MSO-Henkin witnesses if and only if for every formula φ, if ¬∀xφ ∈ ∆ (respectively ¬∀Xφ ∈ ∆), then ¬φ[x/t] ∈ ∆ for some term t (respectively ¬φ[X/T ] ∈ ∆ with T either a monadic predicate or a set variable).
Lemma 6. (MSO Lindenbaum lemma) Let σ * = σ ∪ {c n | n ∈ N} ∪ {P n | n ∈ N}, with c i / ∈ σ and P i / ∈ σ. If Γ ⊆ F ORM (σ) is consistent, then there exists a maximally consistent set Γ * such that Γ ⊆ Γ * and Γ * contains MSO-Henkin witnesses.
Proof. Let Γ be a M SO consistent set of well formed formulas in a countable vocabulary. We expand the language by adding countably many new constants and countably many new monadic predicates. Then Γ remains consistent as a set of well formed formulas in the new language. For all the sets constituted of one formula in the new language, one FO variable and one MSO variable, we adopt the following fixed exhaustive enumeration:
(possible since the language is countable), where the φ i are formulas, the x i are FO variables and the X i , MSO variables.
• Let θ 2n−1 be ¬∀x n φ n → ¬φ n [x n /c l ], where c l is the first of the new constants neither occurring in φ n nor in θ k with k < 2n − 1
• Let θ 2n be ¬∀X n φ n → ¬φ n [X n /P l ], where P l is the first of the new monadic predicates neither occurring in φ n nor in θ k with k < 2n
Call Θ the set of all the θ i .
Claim 1. Γ ∪ Θ is consistent
If not, then because deductions are finite, for some m ≥ 0, Γ ∪ {θ 1 , . . . , θ m , θ m+1 } is inconsistent. Take the least such m, then by the (derivable) rule of reductio ad absurdum, Γ ∪ {θ 1 , . . . , θ m } ¬θ m+1 . Now there are two cases: 
The reasoning is similar (we use the MSO generalization theorem instead of the FO one).
We now extend in the standard way the consistent set Γ ∪ Θ to a maximal consistent set Γ * which is maximal in the sense that for any well formed formula φ either φ ∈ Γ * or φ / ∈ Γ * .
Definition 18. Let Γ * ⊆ F ORM (σ) be maximally consistent and contain Henkin witnesses. We define an equivalence relation on the set of FO terms, by letting t 1 ≡ Γ * t 2 iff t 1 = t 2 ∈ Γ * . We denote the equivalence class of a term t by |t|.
Proposition 5. ≡ Γ * is an equivalence relation.
Proof. By F O5 and F O6.
We will now show that if Γ * is maximally consistent and contains Henkin witnesses, then Γ * has a MSO-Henkin model M Γ * .
Definition 19. We define M Γ * (together with a valuation g Γ * ) out of Γ * .
•
T is a set variable or a monadic predicate} where
We still need to show that A M Γ * is closed under MSO definability. We will be able to do that after having shown the following truth lemma.
Lemma 7. (Truth lemma) For any
Proof. By induction on φ. The base case (for atomic formulas) follows from the definition of M Γ * together with the maximality of Γ * . Now consider the inductive step:
• Boolean connectives: standard (no difference with usual FO Henkin completeness proofs).
• FO quantifier: we want to show that Now we show ∀xφ ∈ Γ * entails M Γ * , g Γ * |= ∀xφ. We take the contraposition:
• Set quantifier: we want to show that
(because for any set variable X, g Γ * (X) = A X and for any monadic predicate P , P M Γ * = A P .) By induction hypothesis, for all T , φ[X/T ] ∈ Γ * . Now suppose ¬∀Xφ ∈ Γ * , then by construction of Γ * there exists a variable X m such that ¬φ[X/X m ] ∈ Γ * , but this contradicts what we get by induction hypothesis, so ¬∀Xφ / ∈ Γ * and by maximal consistency of Γ * , ∀Xφ ∈ Γ * . Now we show ∀Xφ ∈ Γ * entails M Γ * , g Γ * |= ∀Xφ. We take the contraposition
Proposition 6. M Γ * is a MSO-Henkin structure.
Proof. Essentially here we will use the fact that M Γ * is a model of all the COM P instances. We want to see that all sets which are parametrically definable using our MSOlanguage are in the set of admissible subsets of M Γ * . Let φ be a MSO formula, x a variable and x 1 , . . . , x n , X n+1 , . . . , X m the sequence, ordered by occurrence, of all the free variables of φ, apart from x. Take any set variable X not free in φ. By hypothesis, M is a model of the sentence
Therefore for all objects a 1 , . . . , a n and admissible subsets A n+1 , . . . , A m (M, a 1 , . . . , a n , A n+1 , . . . , A m ) is a model of ∃X∀x(Xx ↔ φ)
This A ∈ A M is precisely the relation parametrically defined by the formula φ and the variables mentioned above.
4
Theorem 5. Every M SO consistent set Γ of MSO sentences is satisfiable in a MSOHenkin structure.
Proof. First turn Γ into a maximal consistent set Γ * in a possibly richer language σ * with Henkin witnesses. Then build a structure M Γ * out of this Γ * . Then the structure M Γ * satisfies Γ * and hence also the (subset) Γ.
A.2 The FO(TC 1 )-Henkin Completeness Proof
The following proof is a variation of the proofs in [6] and [16] . The originality of the FO(TC 1 ) case essentially lies in the notion of FO(TC 1 )-Henkin witness of Definition 20. In order to use this notion in the proof of Lemma 9, we also need the following lemma:
Lemma 8. Let Γ be a consistent set of FO(TC 1 ) formulas and θ a FO(TC 1 ) formula of the form ∀x(φ ↔ P x) with P a fresh monadic predicate (i.e. not appearing in Γ). Then Γ ∪ {θ} is also consistent.
Proof. Suppose Γ ∪ {∀x(φ ↔ P x)} is inconsistent, so there is some proof of ⊥ from formulas in Γ ∪ {∀x(φ ↔ P x)}. We first rename all bound variables in the proof with variables which had no occurrence in the proof or in ∀x(φ ↔ P x) (this is possible since proofs are finite objects and we have a countable stock of variables). Also, whenever in the proof the FO(TC 1 ) generalization rule is applied on some unary predicate P , we make sure that this P is different from the unary predicate that we want to substitute by φ and which does not appear in the proof; this is always possible because we have a countable set of unary predicates. Now, we replace in the proof all occurrences of P x by φ (as we renamed bound variables, there is no accidental binding of variables by wrong quantifiers). Then, every occurrence of ∀x(φ ↔ P x) in the proof becomes an occurrence of ∀x(φ ↔ φ) i.e. we have obtained a proof of ⊥ from Γ ∪ {∀x(φ ↔ φ)} i.e. from Γ (∀x(φ ↔ φ) is an axiom, as it can be obtained by FO generalization from a tautology of sentential calculus). It entails that Γ is already inconsistent, which contradicts the consistency of Γ. Now it remains to show that the replacement procedure of all occurrences of P x by φ, is correct, that is, we still have a proof of ⊥ after it. Every time the replacement occurs in an axiom (or its generalization, which is still an axiom as we defined it), then the result is still an instance of the given axiom schema (even for FO(TC 1 ) generalizations, because we took care that P is never used in the proof for a FO(TC 1 ) generalization). Also, as replacement is applied uniformly in the proof, every application of modus ponens stays correct: consider ψ → ξ and ψ. Obviously the result ψ * of the substitution will allow to derive the result ξ * of the substitution from ψ * → ξ * and ψ * . Also ⊥ * is simply ⊥, so the procedure gives us a proof of ⊥.
Definition 20. We say that a set of FO(TC 1 ) formulas ∆ contains FO(TC 1 )-Henkin witnesses if and only if the two following conditions hold. First, for every formula φ, if ¬∀xφ ∈ ∆, then ¬φ[x/t] ∈ ∆ for some term t and if ¬[T C xy φ](u, v) ∈ ∆, then P u ∧ ∀x∀y((P x ∧ φ(x, y)) → P y) ∧ ¬P v ∈ ∆ for some monadic predicate P . Second, if φ ∈ ∆ and x is a free variable of φ, then ∀x(P x ↔ φ(x)) ∈ ∆ for some monadic predicates P .
Lemma 9. (FO(TC
1 ) Lindenbaum lemma) Let σ * = σ ∪ {c n | n ∈ N with c n a new individual constant, }∪{P n | n ∈ N with P n a new monadic predicate}. If Γ ⊆ F ORM (σ) is consistent, then there exists a maximally consistent set Γ * of σ * formulas such that Γ ⊆ Γ * and Γ * contains FO(TC 1 )-Henkin witnesses.
Proof. Let Γ be a FO(TC 1 ) consistent set of well formed formulas in a countable vocabulary σ. We expand the language into σ * by adding countably many new constants and countably many new monadic predicates. Then Γ remains FO(TC 1 ) consistent as a set of well formed formulas in the new language. For all the pairs constituted by one formula and one variable of σ * and all the pairs constituted by one formula and two terms of σ * , we adopt the following fixed exhaustive enumeration:
(possible since the language is countable), where the φ i are formulas, the x i are variables and the u i , v i are terms.
• Let θ 3n−2 be ¬∀x 2n−1 φ 2n−1 → ¬φ 2n−1 [x 2n−1 /c l ], where c l is the first of the new constants neither occurring in φ 2n−1 nor in θ k with k < 3n − 2
• Let θ 3n−1 be ∀x 2n−1 (φ 2n−1 ↔ P l x 2n−1 ), where P l is the first of the new monadic predicates neither occurring in φ 2n−1 nor in θ k with k ≤ 3n − 1.
where P l is the first of the new monadic predicates neither occurring in φ 2n nor in θ k with k ≤ 3n
Claim 2. Γ ∪ Θ is consistent
If not, then because deductions are finite, for some m ≥ 0, Γ ∪ {θ 1 , . . . , θ m , θ m+1 } is inconsistent. Take the least such m, then by the reductio ad absurdum rule, Γ ∪ {θ 1 , . . . , θ m } ¬θ m+1 . Now there are three cases:
(1) θ m+1 is of the form ¬∀xφ → ¬φ [x/c] (see the MSO case for how to handle this case)
In such a case both Γ ∪ {θ 1 . . . θ m } ¬[T C xy φ](u, v) and Γ ∪ {θ 1 . . . θ m } (P u ∧ ∀x∀y((P x ∧ φ(x, y)) → P v) → P v hold. Since P does not appear in any formula We then turn Γ ∪ Θ into a maximal consistent set Γ * in the standard way.
We now define M Γ * and g Γ * as we did for MSO.
Lemma 10. (Truth lemma) For any FO(TC
Proof. By induction on φ.
The base case follows from the definition of M Γ * together with the maximality of Γ * . Now consider the inductive step:
• Boolean connectives and FO quantifier: as in MSO
• TC operator: we want to show that
* . And so by the same argument as the one used in the FO quantifier step of the present induction,
Then as Γ
* contains Henkin witnesses, there is a predicate P m such that P m u ∧ ∀x∀y((P m x ∧ φ(x, y)) → P m y) ∧ ¬P m v ∈ Γ * . But that contradicts the maximal consistency of Γ * . Then ¬[T C xy φ(x, y)](u, v) ∈ Γ * and by maximal consistency of Γ * , [T C xy φ(x, y)](u, v) ∈ Γ * .
-
We consider the contraposition
Then by the T C axiom, for every monadic predicate P m , (P m u ∧ ∀x∀y((P m x ∧ φ(x, y)) → P m y)) → P m v ∈ Γ * . But that contradicts the maximal consistency of Γ * . Then [T C xy φ(x, y)](u, v) ∈ Γ * and by maximal consistency of Γ * , ¬[T C xy φ(x, y)](u, v) ∈ Γ * .
Proposition 7. M Γ * is a FO(TC 1 )-Henkin structure.
Proof. By construction of Γ * this is immediate (we introduced a monadic predicate for each parametrically definable subset). Definition 21. We say that a set of FO(LFP 1 ) formulas ∆ contains FO(LFP 1 ) Henkin witnesses if and only if the two following conditions hold. First, for every formula φ, if ¬∀xφ ∈ ∆, then ¬φ[x/t] ∈ ∆ for some term t and if ¬[LF P xX φ]y ∈ ∆, then ¬P y ∧ ¬∃x(¬P x ∧ φ(P, x)) ∈ ∆ for some new monadic predicate P . Second, if φ ∈ ∆ and x is a free variable of φ, then ∀x(P x ↔ φ(x)) ∈ ∆ for some monadic predicates P . Proof. Let Γ be a consistent set of well formed FO(LFP 1 ) formulas in a countable vocabulary. We expand the language by adding countably many new constants and countably many new monadic predicates. Then Γ remains consistent as a set of well formed formulas in the new language. For every pair constituted by one formula and one FO variable of σ * , we adopt the following fix exhaustive enumeration:
Lemma 11. (FO(LFP
< φ 1 , x 1 >, < φ 2 , x 2 >, < φ 3 , x 3 >, < φ 4 , x 4 >, . . .
(possible since the language is countable), where the φ i are formulas and the x i are FO variables.
• Let θ 3n−2 be ¬∀x n φ n → ¬φ[x n /c l ], where c l is the first of the new constants neither occurring in φ n nor in θ k with k < 3n − 2.
• Let θ 3n−1 be ¬[LF P xX φ n ]x n → (¬P l x n ∧ ¬∃x(¬P l x ∧ φ(P l , x))), where P l is the first of the new monadic predicates neither occurring in φ n nor in θ k with k < 3n − 1.
• Let θ 3n be ∀x n (φ n ↔ P l x n ), where P l is the first of the new monadic predicates neither occurring in φ n nor in θ k with k < 3n.
Claim 3. Γ ∪ Θ is consistent
(1) θ m+1 is of the form ¬∀xφ → φ[x/c] (see the MSO case for how to handle this case) (2) θ m+1 is of the form ¬[LF P xX φ]y → (¬P y ∧ ¬∃x(¬P x ∧ φ(P, x))).
In such a case both Γ ∪ {θ 1 . . . θ m } ¬[LF P xX φ]y and Γ ∪ {θ 1 . . . θ m } ¬P y ∧ ¬∃x(¬P x ∧ φ(P, x)) hold. Since P does not appear in any formula on the left, by FO(LFP 1 ) generalization, Γ ∪ {θ 1 . . . θ m } [LF P xX φ]y, which contradicts the leastness of m (or the consistency of Γ if m = 0) (3) θ m+1 is of the form ∀x(φ ↔ P x) (see the FO(TC 1 ) case for how to handle this case, just consider the FO(LFP 1 ) generalization rule instead of the FO(TC 1 ) one in Lemma 8)
We then turn Γ ∪ Θ into a maximal consistent set Γ * in the standard way.
Lemma 12. (Truth lemma) For any FO(LFP
• LF P operator: we want to show that
And so by the same argument as the one used in the FO quantifier step of the present induction,
Henkin witnesses, there is a predicate P m such that ¬P m y ∧ ¬∃x(¬P m x ∧ φ(P m , x) ∈ Γ * . But that contradicts the maximal consistency of Γ * . Then ¬[LF P xX φ]y ∈ Γ * and by maximal consistency of Γ * , [LF P xX φ]y ∈ Γ * .
-We now show that [LF P xX φ]y ∈ Γ * implies M Γ * , g Γ * |= [LF P xX φ]y. We consider the contraposition
and by induction hypothesis for all for all t k , ¬P i y∧(P i t k ∨¬φ(P i , t k )) ∈ Γ * . And so by the same argument as the one used in the FO quantifier step of the present induction, ¬P i y ∧∀x(P i x∨¬φ(P i , x)) ∈ Γ * i.e. (by maximal consistency) ¬P i y ∧ ¬∃x(¬P i x ∧ φ(P i , x)) ∈ Γ * . Now suppose [LF P xX φ]y ∈ Γ * . Then by the LF P axiom, for every monadic predicate P m , 
B Relativization Lemma
Lemma 13 (Relativization lemma). Let M be a Λ-Henkin-structure, g a valuation on M, φ, ψ Λ-formulas and A = {x | M, g |= ψ}. If g(y) ∈ A for every variable y occurring free in φ and g(Y ) ∈ M A for every set variable Y occurring free in φ,
Proof. By induction on the complexity of φ. Let g be an assignment satisfying the required conditions. Base case: φ is an atom and REL(φ, ψ, x) = φ. So M, g |= φ ⇔ M A, g |= φ (by hypothesis, g is a suitable assignment for both models). Inductive hypothesis: the property holds for every φ of complexity at most n. Now consider φ of complexity n + 1.
• φ :≈ φ 1 ∧φ 2 and REL(φ 1 ∧φ 2 , ψ, x) :≈ REL(φ 1 , ψ, x)∧REL(φ 2 , ψ, x). By induction hypothesis, the property holds for φ 1 and for φ 2 . By the semantics of ∧, it also holds for φ 1 ∧ φ 2 . (Similar for ∨, →, ¬.)
• φ :≈ ∃yχ and REL ( • φ :≈ ∃Y χ and REL(∃Y χ, ψ, x) = ∃Y ((Y x → ψ) ∧ REL(χ, ψ, x)). As every admissible subset of M A is also admissible in M (by Proposition 2) it follows by inductive hypothesis that for any
Hence, by the semantics of ∃ and by definition of A,
• , v) . By definition of T C, the following are equivalent:
It is clear that 5. ⇒ 4.. For the 4. ⇒ 5. direction, assume 4.. Take any set
, by definition of A, a ∈ A. So a ∈ A ∩ C, i.e, a ∈ B and since we proved it for arbitrary a ∈ dom(M), by 4., g(z) ∈ B. As B ⊆ C, it follows that g(z) ∈ C.
C Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé Games on Henkin-Structures
Let Λ ∈ {MSO, FO(TC 1 ), FO(LFP 1 )}. In this appendix, we survey Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé games for FO, MSO, FO(TC 1 ), and FO(LFP 1 ) which are suitable to use on Henkin structures. We also provide adequacy proofs for the MSO game and for the FO(TC 1 ) game. Let us first introduce basic notions connected to these games. One, rather trivial, sufficient condition for Λ equivalence is the existence of an isomorphism. Clearly isomorphic structures satisfy the same Λ-formulas. A more interesting sufficient condition for elementary equivalence is that of Duplicator having a winning strategy in all Λ EhrenfeuchtFraïssé games of finite length. To define this, we first need this notion:
Definition 22 (Finite partial isomorphism). A finite partial isomorphism between structures M and N is a finite relation { (a 1 , b 1 ) , . . . , (a n , b n )} between the domains of M and N such that for all atomic formulas φ(
Since equality statements are atomic formulas, every finite partial isomorphism is (the graph of) a injective partial function.
We will also need the following lemma: Lemma 14 (Finiteness lemma). Fix any set x 1 , . . . , x k , X k+1 , . . . , X m . In a finite relational vocabulary, up to logical equivalence, with these free variables, there are only finitely many Λ-formulas of quantifier depth ≤ n.
Proof. This can be shown by induction on k. In a finite relational vocabulary, with finitely many free variables, there are only finitely many atomic formulas. Now, any Λ-formula of quantifier depth k + 1 is equivalent to a Boolean combination of atoms and formulas of quantifier depth k prefixed by a quantifier. Applying a quantifier to equivalent formulas preserves equivalence and the Boolean closure of a finite set of formulas remains finite, up to logical equivalence. Now, as we are concerned with extensions of FO, every Λ game will be defined as an extension of the classical FO game, that we recall here:
Definition 23 (FO Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé game). The FO Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé game of length n on structures M and N (notation: EF n F O (M, N) ) is as follows. There are two players, Spoiler and Duplicator. The game has n rounds, each of which consists of a move of Spoiler followed by a move of Duplicator. Spoiler's moves consist of picking an element from one of the two structures, and Duplicator's responses consist of picking an element in the other structure. In this way, Spoiler and Duplicator build up a finite binary relation between the domains of the two structures: initially, the relation is empty; each round, it is extended with another pair. The winning conditions are as follows: if at some point of the game the constructed binary relation is not a finite partial isomorphism, then Spoiler wins immediately. If after each round the relation is a finite partial isomorphism, then the game is won by Duplicator.
Theorem 8 (Adequacy (Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé) ). Assume a finite relational first-order language. Duplicator has a winning strategy in the game EF Proof. The proof for the first order case is classic. We refer the reader to the proof given by Flum and Ebbinghaus in [5] .
For technical convenience in the course of inductive proofs, we extend the notion of FO parameter by considering set parameters, i.e., instead of interpreting a set variable as a name of the set A, we can add a new monadic predicate A to the signature. The new predicates and the sets they name are called set parameters. (This is similar to the FO notion which can be found in [11] .) We will work with parametrized structures, i.e., the assignment is possibly non empty at the beginning of the game, which can begin with some "handicap" for Duplicator, which is some preliminary set of already "distinguished objects and sets" (for distinguished objects, think, for instance, about the situation where we would allow individual constants in the language).
C.1 Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé Game for MSO
We define a necessary and sufficient condition for MSO equivalence by extending Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé games from FO to MSO. This game has already been defined in the literature, see for instance [14] . For the sake of the induction, we will work with expanded structures (i.e. structures considered together with partial valuations). (N,B,b) ) of length n on expanded structures (M,Ā,ā) and (N,B,b) is defined as for the first-order case, except that each time she chooses a structure, Spoiler can choose either an element or an admissible subset of its domain. For a given A r+1 ∈ A M chosen by Spoiler, (M,Ā,ā) is expanded to (M,Ā, A r+1 ,ā). Duplicator then responds by choosing B r+1 ∈ A N and (N,B,b) is expanded to (N,B, B r+1 ,b) . The game goes on with the so expanded structures. The winning conditions are as follows: if at some point of the gameā →b is not a finite partial isomorphism from (M,Ā, A r+1 ) to (N,B, B r+1 ), then Spoiler wins immediately. If after each round the relation is a finite partial isomorphism, then the game is won by Duplicator.
Definition 24 (MSO Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé game). Consider
Theorem 9 (Adequacy). Assume a finite relational MSO language. Given M and N,
s ,b ∈ dom(N) s and r ≥ 0, s ≥ 0, n ≥ 0, Duplicator has a winning strategy in the game EF By induction on n.
Base step: With 0 round the initial match between the distinguished objects must have been a partial isomorphism for Duplicator to win. Thus (M,Ā,ā) and (N,B,b) agree on all atomic formulas and on their Boolean combinations (which are precisely the formulas of quantifiers depth 0).
Inductive step: The inductive hypothesis says that, for any two expanded MSO structures, if Duplicator can win their comparison game over n rounds, then they agree on all MSO formulas up to quantifier depth n. Now assume that for some (M,Ā,ā), (N,B,b) Duplicator has a winning strategy for the game over n+1 rounds. Consider any MSO formula φ of quantifier depth n + 1. Any such sentence should be equivalent to a Boolean combination of atoms and formulas of the form ∃x i χ(x i ) and ∃X i ψ(X i ), with χ(x i ), ψ(X i ) of quantifier depth at most n. Thus it suffices to show that (M,Ā,ā), (N,B,b) agree on the latter forms. They do so on atoms, as Duplicator can certainly win over 0 rounds. So let suppose (M,Ā,ā)
. Now, Duplicator's given winning strategy has a response for whatever Spoiler might do in the n + 1 round game. In particular, let Spoiler select A i in A M . Then Duplicator has a response B i in A N such that her remaining strategy still gives her a win in the n-round game played on (M,Ā, A i ,ā) and (N,B, B i ,b) . By the inductive hypothesis, these expanded structures agree on all formulas up to quantifier depth n and hence also on ψ(X i ). Therefore (N,B, B i ,b) |= ψ(X i ) and hence (N,B,b) |= ∃X i ψ(X i ).
⇐ From the fact that (M,Ā,ā) and (N,B,b) satisfy the same MSO formulas of quantifier depth n to the existence of a winning strategy for Duplicator in EF n M SO (M, N). Base step: Doing nothing is a strategy for Duplicator.
Inductive step: The inductive hypothesis says that, for any two expanded MSO structures, if they agree on all MSO formulas up to quantifier depth n, then Duplicator has a winning strategy in the n-round corresponding game. Now, assume that some structures (M,Ā,ā), (N,B,b) agree on all MSO formulas of quantifier depth n + 1. We can infer that Duplicator has a winning strategy in the n + 1-round game. The first move in her strategy is as follows. Let Spoiler choose A i ∈ A M (the case where she rather chooses a i in dom(M) is symmetric). Now, Duplicator looks at the set of MSO formulas of quantifier depth n + 1 that hold of A i in (M,Ā,ā). By the finiteness lemma, this set is finite modulo logical equivalence, and hence, one existential formula ∃X i ψ(X i ) true in the structure summarizes all this information. As (M,Ā,ā), (N,B,b) agree on all MSO formulas of quantifier depth n + 1, and ∃X i ψ(X i ) is such a sentence, it also holds in (N,B,b) . So, Duplicator can choose a witness B i . Then, the so expanded structures (M,Ā, A i ,ā), (N,B, B i ,b) agree on all MSO sentences up to quantifier depth n, and by the inductive hypothesis, Duplicator has a winning strategy in the remaining n-round game between them. Her initial response plus the latter gives her over-all strategy over n + 1 rounds.
Note that this proof holds for MSO with any semantics (e.g. standard, Henkin...).
We are interested in "choice of an element" versus "quantification", but neither the exact domain of quantification does never play any role in our reasoning. The game that we will be introducing in this section had been already mentioned in passing by Grädel in [9] as an alternative to the game he used. We will show that it is adequate on Henkin-structures. (N,b) ) there are two types of moves, ∃ (or point) moves and FO(TC 1 ) moves. Each point move extends an assignment {ā →b} with elements a k ∈ dom(M), b k ∈ dom(N). Each FO(TC 1 ) move extends an assignment {ā →b} with elements a k , a k+1 ∈ dom(M), b k , b k+1 ∈ dom(N). After each move, Spoiler chooses the kind of move to be played. We assume that the assignment {ā →b} has to be extended. The ∃ move is defined as in the FO case. The FO(TC 1 ) move is as follows: Spoiler considers two pebbles (a i , b i ) and (a j , b j ) on the board and depending on the structure that he chooses to consider, he plays:
• either A ∈ A M with a i ∈ A and a j / ∈ A. Duplicator then answers with B ∈ A N such that b i ∈ B and b j / ∈ B. Spoiler now picks b k ∈ B, b k+1 / ∈ B and Duplicator answers with a k ∈ A, a k+1 / ∈ A.
• either B ∈ A N with b i ∈ B and b j / ∈ B. Duplicator then answers with A ∈ A M such that a i ∈ A and a j / ∈ A. Spoiler now picks a k ∈ A, a k+1 / ∈ A and Duplicator answers with b k ∈ B, b k+1 / ∈ B.
In each FO(TC 1 ) move, the assignment is extended with a k → b k , a k+1 → b k+1 . After n moves, Duplicator has won if the constructed assignmentā →b is a partial isomorphism (i.e. the game continues with the two new pebbles in each structure, but the sets A and B are forgotten).
Theorem 10 (Adequacy). Assume a finite relational FO(TC 1 ) language. Given M and N,ā ∈ M s ,b ∈ N s and r ≥ 0, s ≥ 0, n ≥ 0, Spoiler has a winning strategy in the game EF (N,b) ) iff there is a FO(TC 1 ) formula of quantifier depth n distinguishing (M,ā) and (N,b).
Proof.
⇒ From the existence of a winning strategy for Spoiler in EF (N,b) ) to the existence of a FO(TC 1 ) formula of quantifier depth n distinguishing (M,ā) and (N,b).
By induction on n.
Base step: With 0 round the initial match between distinguished objects must have failed to be a partial isomorphism for Spoiler to win. This implies that (M,ā) and (N,b) disagree on some atomic formula.
Inductive step: The inductive hypothesis says that for any two structures, if Spoiler can win their comparison game over n rounds, then the structures disagree on some FO(TC 1 ) formula of quantifier depth n. Now assume that for some structures (M,ā), (N,b), Spoiler has a winning strategy for the game over n + 1 rounds. Let us reason on Spoiler's first move in the game. It can either be a FO(TC 1 ) or an ∃ move.
If it is an ∃ move, then it means that Spoiler picks an element a in one of the two structures, so that no matter what element b Duplicator picks in the other, Spoiler has an n-round winning strategy. But then we can use the induction hypothesis, and find for each such b a formula φ b (x) that distinguishes (M,ā, a) from (N,b, b) . In fact we can assume that in each case the respective formula is true of (M,ā, a) and false of (N,b, b) (by negating the formula if needed). Now take the big conjunction φ(x) of all these formulas (which is equivalent to a finite formula according to the finiteness lemma) and prefix it with an existential quantifier. Then the resulting formula is true in (M,ā) but false in (N,b) . It is true in (M,ā) if we pick a for the existentially quantified variable. And no matter which element we pick in (N,b), it will always falsify one of the conjuncts in the formula, by construction. So, the new formula is false in (N,b) . I.e., ∃xφ(x) of quantifier depth n + 1 distinguishes (M,ā) and (N,b).
If Spoiler's first move is a FO(TC 1 ) move, then it means that Spoiler picks a subset in one structure, let say A ∈ A M (with a i ∈ A and a j ∈ A), so that no matter which B ∈ A N (with b i ∈ B and b j ∈ B) Duplicator picks in the other structure, Spoiler can pick b k ∈ B, b k+1 ∈ B such that no matter which a k ∈ A, a k+1 ∈ A Duplicator picks, Spoiler has an n-round winning strategy. For each B that might be chosen by Duplicator, Spoiler's given strategy gives a fixed couple b k , b k+1 . For each response a k , a k+1 of Duplicator, we thus obtain by inductive hypothesis a discriminating formula φ B,a k ,a k+1 (x, y) that we can assume to be true in (N,b) for b k , b k+1 and false in (M,ā) for a k , a k+1 . Now for each B, let us take the big conjunction Φ B (x, y) of all these formulas (which is finite, by the finiteness lemma). We can then construct the big disjunction Φ(x, y) (again finite, by the same lemma) of all the formulas Φ B (x, y).
Considering the first round in the game together with the inductive hypothesis, note that it holds in (M,ā) that ∃X(a i ∈ X ∧ a j ∈ X ∧ ∀xy((x ∈ X ∧ y ∈ X) → ¬Φ(x, y))). Indeed, by induction hypothesis, any couple a k ∈ A, a k+1 ∈ A that Duplicator might choose in dom(M) will always falsify at least one of the conjuncts of each Φ B (x, y). Finally, the formula Φ(x, y) being constructed as the disjunction of all the formulas Φ B (x, y), any such couple a k , a k+1 will also falsify Φ(x, y). Now ∃X(a i ∈ X ∧ a j ∈ X ∧ ∀xy((x ∈ X ∧ y ∈ X) → ¬Φ(x, y))) is equivalent 5 to ∃X(a i ∈ X ∧ a j ∈ X ∧ ¬∃xy(x ∈ X ∧ Φ(x, y) ∧ y ∈ X)), which means that (M,ā) |= [T C xy Φ(x, y)](a i , a j ).
On the other hand for the same reasons, note that it holds in (N,b) that ∀X((b i ∈ X ∧ b j ∈ X) → ∃xy(x ∈ X ∧ y ∈ X ∧ Φ(x, y))). Indeed, by induction hypothesis, for each B that Duplicator might choose in A N Spoiler will always be able to find a couple b k ∈ B, b k+1 ∈ B satisfying all the conjuncts of the corresponding formulas Φ B (x, y). Finally, the formula Φ(x, y) being constructed as the disjunction of all the formulas Φ B (x, y), such a couple a k , a k+1 will also satisfy Φ(x, y).
Let u be a name for the parameters a i , b i and v for b i , b j . [T C xy Φ(x, y)](u, v) of quantifier depth n + 1 distinguishes (N,ā) and (M,b) .
⇐ From the existence of a FO(TC 1 ) formula of quantifier depth n distinguishing (M,ā) and (N,b) to the existence of a winning strategy for Spoiler in EF n F O+T C ((M,ā), (N,b) ). Base step: Doing nothing is a strategy for Spoiler.
Inductive step: The inductive hypothesis says that, for any two structures, if they disagree on some FO(TC 1 ) formula of quantifier depth n, then Duplicator has a winning strategy in the n-round game. Now, assume that some expanded structures (M,ā), (N,b) disagree on some FO(TC 1 ) formula χ of quantifier depth n + 1. Any such formula must be equivalent to a Boolean combination of formulas of the form ∃xψ(x) and [T C xy φ(x, y)](u, v) with ψ, φ of quantifier depth at most n. If χ distinguishes the two structures, then there is at least one component of this Boolean combination which suffices distinguishing them.
Let us first suppose that it is of the form ∃xψ(x) and such that (M,ā) |= ∃xψ(x) whereas (N,b) |= ∃xψ(x). Then it means that there exists an object a ∈ dom(M) such that (M,ā) |= ψ(a) whereas for every object b ∈ dom(N), (N,b) |= ψ(b). But then we can use our induction hypothesis and find for each such b a winning strategy for Spoiler in EF (N,b, b) ). We can infer that Spoiler has a winning strategy in EF (N,b) ). His first move consists in picking the object a in M and for each response b in N of Duplicator, the remaining of his winning strategy is the same as in EF n FO(TC 1 ) ((M,ā, a), (N,b, b) ).
Let us now suppose that [T C xy φ(x, y)](u, v) of quantifier depth n + 1 distinguishes the two structures such that (M,ā) |= [T C xy φ(x, y)](u, v) i.e. it holds in (M,ā) that ∀X((a i ∈ X ∧ a j ∈ X) → ∃xy(x ∈ X ∧ y ∈ X ∧ φ(x, y))), whereas (N,b) |= [T C xy φ(x, y)](u, v) i.e. it holds in (N,b) that ∃X(b i ∈ X ∧ b j ∈ X ∧ ¬∃xy(x ∈ X ∧ φ(x, y) ∧ y ∈ X)). We want to show that Spoiler has a winning strategy in EF (N,b) ). Let us describe her first move. She first chooses (N,b) and B ∈ A N such that b i ∈ B∧b j ∈ B∧¬∃xy(x ∈ B∧φ(x, y)∧y ∈ B). By definition of T C, such a set exists. Duplicator has to respond by picking a set A in A M . Spoiler then picks a k ∈ A and a k+1 ∈ A such that (M,ā) |= φ(a k , a k+1 ). This is possible because by definition of T C, for any possible choice A of Duplicator we have ∃xy(x ∈ A ∧ y ∈ A ∧ φ(x, y)). But that means that Duplicator is now stuck and has to pick b k ∈ B and b k+1 ∈ B such that (N,b) |= φ(b k , b k+1 ). Consequently, we have (N,b, b k , b k+1 ) |= φ(x, y), whereas (M,ā, a k , a k+1 ) |= φ(x, y). As φ(x, y) is of quantifier depth n, by induction hypothesis, Spoiler has a winning strategy in EF ((M,ā), (N,b)) (i.e. after her first move, that we already accounted for) is consequently as in EF There are two classical equivalent syntactic ways to define the syntax of FO(LFP 1 ): the one we used in Section 1.2 and an other one, dispensing with restrictions to positive formulas, but allowing negations only in front of atomic formulas and introducing a greatest fixpoint operator as the dual of the least fixpoint operator (also ∀ cannot be defined using ∃ and has to be introduced separately, similarly for the Boolean connectives). This second way to define FO(LFP 1 ) turns out to be more convenient to define an adequate EhrenfeuchtFraïssé game. The game is suitable to use on Henkin structures because the semantics on which it relies is merely a syntactical variant of the one given in Section 3. Now the FO(LFP 1 ) formulas [LF P x,X φ(x, X)]y and [GF P x,X φ(x, X)]y, stating that a point belongs to the least fixpoint, or respectively, to the greatest fixpoint induced by the formula φ satisfy the following equations:
This is the key idea behind an Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé game defined by Uwe Bosse in [2] for least fixpoint logic LFP (i.e. where fixpoints are not only considered for monadic operators, but for any n-ary operator). FO(LFP 1 ) being simply the monadic fragment of LFP, the game for LFP can be adapted to FO(LFP 1 ) in a straightforward way: (N,B,b) ), there are two types of moves, point and fixpoint moves. Each move extends an assignmentā →b,Ā →B with elements a s ∈ dom(M), b s ∈ dom(N), and possibly (in the case of fixpoint moves) with sets A r ∈ A M , B r ∈ A N . After each move, Spoiler chooses the kind of move to be played. We assume that the assignment a →b,Ā →B has to be extended. Now the following moves are possible:
• ∃ move: Spoiler chooses a s+1 ∈ dom(M) and Duplicator b s+1 ∈ dom(N).
• ∀ move: Spoiler chooses b s+1 ∈ dom(N) and Duplicator a s+1 ∈ dom(M).
In each point move, the assignment is extended by a s+1 → b s+1 .
• LF P move: Spoiler chooses B r+1 ∈ A N \ {dom(N)} with some pebble b i ∈ B r+1
and Duplicator responds with A r+1 ∈ A M \ {dom(M)}.
Now
Spoiler chooses in M a new element a s+1 ∈ A r+1 and Duplicator answers in N with b s+1 ∈ B r+1 .
• GF P move: Spoiler chooses A r+1 ∈ A M \ {dom(M)} with some pebble a i ∈ A r+1 and Duplicator responds with B r+1 ∈ A N \ {dom(N)} such that B r+1 = ∅. Now Spoiler chooses in dom(N) a new element b s+1 ∈ B r+1 and Duplicator answers in dom(M) with a s+1 ∈ A r+1 .
In each fixpoint move the assignment is extended by A r+1 → B r+1 , a s+1 → b s+1 . After n moves, Duplicator has won if the constructed element assignmentā →b is a partial isomorphism and for the subset assignmentĀ →B, for any 1 ≤ j ≤ r, i ≤ s:
We call an assignment with these properties a posimorphism.
Theorem 11 (Adequacy). Assume a finite relational FO(LFP 1 ) language. Given M and
s ,b ∈ dom(N) s and r ≥ 0, r ≥ 0, n ≥ 0, Duplicator has a winning strategy in the game EF n FO(LFP 1 ) ((M,Ā,ā), (N,B,b) ) iff (M,Ā,ā) and (N,B,b) satisfy the same FO(LFP 1 ) formula of quantifier depth n.
Proof. We refer the reader to Uwe Bosse [2].
D Fusion Lemmas on Henkin-Structures
Let Λ ∈ {MSO, FO(TC 1 ), FO(LFP 1 )}. In this Appendix, we show our analogues of Feferman-Vaught theorem for fusions of Λ-Henkin-structures. We refer to them as Λ-fusion lemmas in the main part of the paper, even though they will be formally stated as theorems or corollaries below. What we show is, more precisely, that fusion of Λ-Henkinstructures preserve Λ-equivalence.
In order to give inductive proofs for MSO and FO(LFP 1 ), it will be more convenient to consider parametrized Λ-Henkin-structures where the set of set parameters is closed under union, this notion being defined below. This is safe because whenever two parametrized structures (M,Ā,ā) and (N,B,b) are n-Λ-equivalent, it follows trivially that M and N considered together with a subset of this set of parameters are also n-Λ-equivalent.
Definition 27. Let A 1 , . . . , A k be a finite sequence of set parameters. We define (A 1 , . . . , A k ) ∪ as the finite sequence of set parameters obtained by closing the set {A 1 , . . . , A k } under union in such a way that (A 1 , . . . , A k ) ∪ = { i∈I A i |I ⊆ {1, . . . , k}}. (We additionally assume that this set is ordered in a fixed canonical way, depending on the index sets I.)
sequence of first-order parameters of the form a i 1 , . . . , a im with m ∈ N andĀ i a sequence of set parameters of the form A i 1 , . . . , A i m with m ∈ N, similarly for theb i andB i ), then also
Proof. We define a winning strategy for Duplicator in the game EF
Base step: n = 0, doing nothing is a strategy for Duplicator. We need to show that (
. . ,b k ) agree on all atomic formulas. Now in the fusion structures, each atomic formula is defined by f in terms of a σ * -quantifier free formula that is evaluated in the corresponding disjoint union structure. So it is enough to show that the disjoint union structures agree on all atomic σ * -formulas and on their Boolean combinations. The initial match between the distinguished objects in (M i ,Ā i ,ā i ) and (N i ,B i ,b i ) is a partial isomorphism for every 1 ≤ i ≤ k, so it is also one for 1≤i≤k M i ,ā 1 , . . . ,ā k and 1≤i≤k N i ,b 1 , . . . ,b k i.e. the two disjoint union structures extended with FO parameters agree on all σ * -atomic formulas. We still need to show that it is also one for 1≤i≤k M i , (Ā 1 , . . . ,Ā k ) ∪ ,ā 1 , . . . ,ā k and
e. the two disjoint union structures extended with FO parameters and the closure under union of set parameters agree on all σ * -atomic formulas. It is enough to point that for any parameter a i j , for any I ⊆ {i 1 , . . . , i m , . . . , k 1 , k m } by construction of i∈I A i in (Ā 1 , . . . ,Ā k ) ∪ , the following are equivalent:
is not MSO parametrically definable in M i i.e. there are two MSO parametrically indistinguishable points a ∈ A, a / ∈ A. So for all n, for all sequence of parametersā,Ā in
(M i ,ā,Ā, a ) and by the fusion lemma,
Corollary 7. A U 1≤i≤k M i is closed under MSO parametric definability and so 1≤i≤k M i is a MSO-Henkin structure.
Proof. Analoguous to the proof of Corollary 6 (because A L f
D.2 Fusion Lemma for FO(TC 1 )
As T C moves can only be played when there are already two pebbles on the board, it is more convenient to show first a version of our FO(TC 1 ) fusion lemma in which each small structure comes with at least two parameters. This allows us to define Duplicator's answer to a T C move played in a big structure, by means of his winning strategies in the corresponding small structures. We then derive as a corollary the fusion lemma for non parametrized structures.
We want to show that this also holds when the length of the game is n + 1. Suppose Duplicator has a winning strategy in EF
We describe Duplicator's answer to Spoiler's first move in EF
It then follows by induction hypothesis, that he has a winning strategy in the remaining n-length game.
• Spoiler's first move is an ∃ move.
Suppose Spoiler chooses a point a ∈ dom( f 1≤i≤k M i ), then a ∈ dom(M i ) for some 1 ≤ i ≤ k. So Duplicator can use his winning strategy in EF
and pick a corresponding point b in the other structure.
Now he still has a winning strategy in EF
So by induction hypothesis he also has one in the remaining n length game EF
• Spoiler's first move is a T C move. Suppose Spoiler chooses a set A in the set of admissible subsets of Duplicator considers A i together with these two parameters and constructs B i by using his winning strategy in EF
, there are only distinguished objects inside A i 8 , so Duplicator considers any one of these distinguished objects, let say a j and looks at A i \{a j } together with some parameter inside A i , so that he can use his winning strategy in EF
c) in dom(M i ), there are only distinguished objects outside A i , 9 so Duplicator similarly considers some distinguished object a j and looks at A i ∪{a j } together with some other parameter outside A i , so that he can use his winning strategy in EF
Once B = B 1 ∪ . . . ∪ B k has been constructed, Spoiler picks two points b ∈ B and b / ∈ B. There are two cases:
1. b and b belong to the domain of one and the same small structure N i ; now dom(M i ) is as previously described in a), b), c) (but not d), because two distinct points cannot belong to one and the same single point structure) and in each case Duplicator does the following: a) Duplicator answers with a, a according to his winning strategy in EF
, so that he still has a winning strategy in EF
By induction hypothesis he also has one in the remaining n length game EF ,ā i , a, a ), (N i ,b i , b, b ) ). By induction hypothesis he also has one in the remaining n length game EF
Duplicator has a winning strategy in EF (N i ,b i , b) ), so Duplicator uses his winning strategy in EF
to pick a , answering as if it was a point move (i.e a has to be n-equivalent to b ), so that he still has a winning strategy in EF
By induction hypothesis he also has one in the remaining n length game EF N i ,b 1 , . . . ,b k , b, b ) ).
We now show a corollary of the preceding lemma, in which the small structure do not come with any distinguished objects:
Proof. We know that Spoiler's first two moves in EF (N j , b j 1 ). Now for the second round in the game, some point a = a l 2 or b = b l 2 coming from the domain of respectively M l or N l will be played by Spoiler and Duplicator will be able to answer so that (M l , a l 1 , a l 2 ) ≡ n−2 FO(TC 1 ) (N l , b l 1 , b l 2 ). Similarly, for each M j such that j = l, we can find points such that (M j , a j 1 , a j 2 ) ≡ Proof. Analoguous to the proof of Corollary 6.
Corollary 11. A U 1≤i≤k M i is closed under FO(TC 1 ) parametric definability and so 1≤i≤k M i is a FO(TC 1 )-Henkin structure.
Proof. Analoguous to the proof of Corollary 7.
2) in dom(M i ), there are only distinguished objects outside A i and A i = ∅, so Duplicator considers any one of these distinguished objects, let say a j and looks at A i ∪ {a j }, so that he can use his winning strategy in EF n+1 FO(LFP 1 ) ((M i ,Ā i ,ā i ), (N i ,B i ,b i )) to construct an answer that we call B i . Now B i = B i \{b j }. This is a correct answer, because the (posimorphism) condition to be maintained is that for every pebble a l on the board at the end of the game, a l ∈ A i ⇒ b l ∈ B i . But by Duplicator's winning strategy in EF n+1 FO(LFP 1 ) ((M i ,Ā i , A i ∪ {a j },ā i ), (N i ,B i , B i ,b i ) ), we know already that for every such pebble, a l ∈ A i ∪ {a j } ⇒ b l ∈ B i , so also a l ∈ A i ⇒ b l ∈ B i \{b j }.
3) B i = dom(M i ). So A i = dom(N i ). As pebbles are only chosen using Duplicator's winning strategies in the small structures, the posimorphism condition will be maintained.
4) B i = ∅. So A i = ∅. As no pebble can belong to this set, the posimorphism condition will be maintained.
Now that B = B 1 ∪ . . . ∪ B k has been constructed, Spoiler picks a new element b ∈ B which belongs to the domain of one particular small structure N i (so b ∈ B i ) and dom(M i ) is as previously described either in 1), 2) or 3) (but not 4), because b cannot belong to the empty set) and in each case Duplicator does the following:
1) Duplicator answers with a according to his winning strategy in EF . This is safe, because the pebble to be chosen has to be fresh, so it won't be a j ;
3) Duplicator picks some random pebble a j in dom(M i ) and considers dom(M i )\{a j }. His winning strategy provides him with a correct answer.
So in any case (either 1), 2) or 3)), Duplicator has a winning strategy in EF • Spoiler's first move is a LFP move.
Symmetric. Proof. Analoguous to the proof of Corollary 6.
Corollary 15. A U 1≤i≤k M i is closed under FO(LFP 1 ) parametric definability and so
